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BOOK REVIEWS
ROOTS OF BRITISH AIR POLICY, by Richard Worcester. Hodder & Stough-
ton Limited St. Paul's House, London, 1966, pp. 224. 30s
Mr. Worcester, a prominent aviation journalist in the United Kingdom,
has undertaken the ambitious task of critically reviewing British aviation
policy making and making recommendations for improvement both in the
policy making institutions and in the substance of the policies. He has
cast his net widely. After a description of the highlights of post-war
policies, the foresight of which he displayed in various critical papers and
an estimate of the influence which he exercised on policy making, he dis-
cusses the roles of the Cabinet, the Parliament, and the Civil Service in
the aviation process, as well as the influence of religion, the arts, profes-
sions, and society. He then deals with particular aspects of the aerospace
industry and the bodies directly connected with it-power plants, the
armed forces, the airlines, jet fighters and bombers, transport aircraft,
vertical risers, missiles and intelligence, nuclear weapons-and finally his
predictions as to the future. The main thrust of the book is directed to
the relationship between the manufacturing industry and the government.
The major difficulty that stands in the way of producing a critical and
authoritative review of United Kingdom air policy is that most of the
reasons which underlie its policy are not published. We do not know the
premises on which the policies are based. Consequently, the reasonableness
of the policies and the competence of the policy makers cannot be tested
-surely an essential part of a book critical of policy making.
Overall he has endeavored to deal with the subject in too short a com-
pass and without adequate research. The result is that he is frequently
superficial. There are dramatic generalizations where a more careful case
by case examination would yield more convincing results. He mentions
a total of 196 manned aircraft projects as being undertaken in twenty
years in England (pp. 9-10) and points out that only seventeen were pro-
duced in substantial quantities. It is impossible to check this statement, for
it is not clear to what aircraft projects he is referring. Do projects include
types of aircraft which were cancelled before first flight? Valid reasons
exist for the cancellation of some types. For instance, a number of air-
craft flown in 1945-47 were ordered in prototype form in anticipation of
the continuance of the war with Japan.
The author is selective in his choice of illustrations to prove his theme,
and indeed his enthusiasm betrays him. To illustrate the United Kingdom's
failure to keep abreast of technical development, he mentions the Black-
burn (now Hawker Siddley) Bucaneer--"needless to say it was subsonic."
(p. 156) This aircraft was designed as a carrier-borne, low-level, high
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subsonic speed interdiction and anti-shipping aircraft. The Grumman A-6
with substantially the same performance, which flew shortly afterwards
and is now in service in the United States Navy, was designed for the same
mission. The L.T.V. Corsair II, also subsonic, is designed for similar func-
tions. Mr. Worcester cannot be unaware of the fact that for some types
of missions supersonic performance may be impracticable or simply un-
necessary. When discussing the failure of the designers to incorporate the
variable geometry wing in the B.A.C. T.S.R.2 he refers to the Grumman
XF10F-1, a project "realistically" started in 1949 and first flown in 1953.
The XF10F-1 is, however, an excellent example of a concept that was
abandoned after only two prototypes had been built because developments
in other areas rendered the concept redundant. It was one of the first naval
carrier-borne fighters to be designed with a swept wing. To enable it to
land and take off from aircraft carriers a variable geometry wing was
fitted. Improvements in naval architecture (the angled deck), and in land-
ing and take off techniques and equipment (the mirror landing sight,
the audio airspeed indicator, and the steam catapult) all of which incident-
ally were developed by the Royal Navy, made it possible to operate swept
wing aircraft from carriers. These developments together with the dis-
abilities inherent in the variable geometry wing-the weight penalty, the
complexity of the equipment required for it, the control problems asso-
ciated with it, and the abandonment of development of the engine power-
ing it-resulted in the decision to discontinue development of the XF 1 OF-1.
Clearly, the decision to develop the XF10F-1 was correct and the reasons
for discontinuing it were correct. This illustrates the danger of sweeping
generalizations on the validity of decisions to develop and discontinue air-
craft. There were good reasons for not incorporating the variable geometry
wing in the T.S.R.2. The designers of that aircraft have pointed out that
in 1958 they considered incorporating the swing wing in the T.S.R.2
design but decided that there was not sufficient information to provide
guaranteed performance within the specified time scale. The troubles en-
countered in the development of the F-111 suggest that their judgment
was a reasonable one.
A number of facts are incorrect. He writes that the true position about
B.O.A.C. was not uncovered until 1964. (p. 30). B.O.A.C.'s Annual Re-
port for the year ending 31 March 1962 (House of Commons Paper 255,
ordered to be printed on 19 July 1962) contained a full disclosure sub-
sequently confirmed by the White Paper of 20 December 1963 (House of
Commons Paper 5). Some readers will be surprised to see that the War-
saw Convention "was modified in the Rome Conference 1933." (p. 130)
"The United Kingdom had signed five other conventions of which the
most important was the Rome Convention of 1933. . . ." (p. 64) While
I do not know if the United Kingdom signed this Convention, it certainly
has never ratified it. I would have thought that the Warsaw Convention
would have taken precedence. The Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1960,
which inter alia abolished the monopoly of scheduled air services that had
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been conferred upon the publicly owned airline corporations by the Civil
Aviation Act 1946, is surprisingly omitted from the book's list of major
statutes.
Mr. Worcester underestimates the problems that faced the British policy
makers in the post-war period. The United Kingdom military forces
existed to protect the United Kingdom and the Empire. In terms of mili-
tary equipment, this policy objective required Royal Air Force and Royal
Navy equipment in as great a variety and quality as that required by the
United States Air Force and the United States Navy. It is clear that the
United Kingdom had decided to rely on sources of supply under its own
control-a continuation of pre-war policies and a policy whose wisdom
was confirmed by the failure of the United States to honor the wartime
agreements about the atomic bomb. As a result of that decision, the
United Kingdom developed an independent deterrent because, as Viscount
Atlee wrote, the United Kingdom could not allow itself to be wholly
in the hands of the United States whose position was not always clear.
Precisely the same reasoning was applied to other weapons. It is Clear now
that it was beyond the capacity of the United Kingdom to manufacture
on time the variety of weapons required due to the continual alterations
in requirements, the speed of technological development in the post-war
period, the longer lead time for the new weapons, the contraction of the
Empire, and finally the cost of new weapons which competed against the
demands of the welfare state. These and other factors placed an insuper-
able strain on those responsible for aircraft procurement. The decision to
buy the Phantom and the Hercules, followed by the F-111 order, repre-
sented a major policy change from independence to dependence for the
supply of major combat aircraft. The contraction of the Empire resulted
in the decision in December, 1967, to withdraw from the Far East in 1971.
Its immediate effect on aircraft procurement was the cancellation of the
order for the F-111, the majority of which were to have been based in
the Indian Ocean. If the F-111 had been a British aircraft, it would have
been added to Mr. Worcester's list on pages 9-10 as part of the "melan-
choly record of ineptitude" and another failure in industry-government
cooperation. The fact is that a basic policy decision rendered it redundant.
There was no failure on the part of those responsible for aircraft pro-
curement. They could not foresee that the Cabinet would make the change
of policy. If there is any failure, it is at the Cabinet level, and then the
failure would be one of postponing the inevitable. But it is not clear that
the decision was inevitable or that it could or ought to have been made
sooner.
I recommended Mr. Worcester's book as an interesting survey of and
commentary on British air policy; but it is not a reliable reference book.
Martin A. Bradley
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THE LAW OF AVIATION, 4th ed., by Rowland W. Fixel. The Michie Com-
pany, Charlottesville, Va., 1967, pp. 914.
The initial contact with the latest edition of Fixel on the Law of Avia-
tion reminds one of meeting the child of a long-standing friend for the
first time. One cannot help noticing the family resemblances-those traits
and characteristics readily identifiable with one or the other of the parents.
The similarities running through all editions of Fixel (First Edition-
1927; Second-1945; Third-1948; Fourth-1967) are substantial. Al-
though some changes in overall organization are to be found in the Fourth
Edition, primary differences lay in the additional material reflecting the
nineteen years of industry growth between editions, now contained in
twenty-nine chapters as contrasted with the previous eighteen. The chap-
ters on Military Aviation Law and on Aerial Warfare which have been re-
tained and updated are unique among current United States aviation texts.
New features include a chapter individually summarizing the aviation laws
of each state which should prove to be a valuable quick reference. Also all
phases of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 are afforded extensive consid-
eration. Unfortunately, the publication process was apparently well under-
way before the final enactment of the United States Department of Trans-
portation Act of 1966, since it is not included.
While in many areas it cannot claim the depth and detail of its British
cousins, e.g., Shawcross and Beaumont or McNair, it does fill a need for a
United States compendium on the subject. Though'perhaps not a research
tool for the specialist, for the general practitioner or student seeking initial
information in some aspect of United States air law it serves as a concise,
and yet comprehensive, single volume reference.
Prof. Carl E. B. McKenry*
INTERNATIONALE LUFTFAHRTABKOMMEN BD. V, Alex Meyer. Karl Hey-
mans Verlag, KG, Koln-Berlin-Bonn-Miinchen, 1964, pp. 411. DM 74.20
The German Institute of Air and Space Law at the University of Co-
logne, an established center for studies and publications in its field, receives
public support for its research and its publications, such as the multiple
volume air law treaties by Professor Alex Meyer, Director of the Institute.
Some might wish that similar support, largely governmental, would gener-
ate in the United States where most aviation and space activities are con-
centrated.
The latest publication, Volume V, is devoted to the Tokyo Convention
on Crimes Aboard Aircraft which was signed in 1963. As Professor Meyer
points out, a convention on this subject was long in the making and was




widely debated before being shaped into its present form. He recommends
that the Tokyo Convention be adopted, a wish echoed by the present ad-
ministration in the United States! Though many States have ratified the
Convention, it has not yet been adopted by the United States.!
The book is particularly useful for the German reader, providing Ger-
man translation of much ICAO documentation (otherwise available only
in English, Spanish, and French) as well as the proceedings of many inter-
national organizations which have debated the issue of crimes aboard air-
craft. For the German-reading non-German it is a useful gathering of va-
ried materials on the Tokyo Convention while for the researcher, working
in a limited field such as international regulation of aviation, where little
effort is made to make documentation available, it is a pleasantry to find
so much material in one place.
Paul B. Larsen
1 Pulsifier & Boyle, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am L. & CoM. 305 (1964).
Scholars do not appear to be entirely in agreement on whether it should be adopted, e.g.,
Gutierrez, Should the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Be Ratified, 31 J. At L. & CoM. 1 (1965).
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